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Listen to me as one listens to the rain, 
not attentive, not distracted, 
light footsteps, thin drizzle, 
water that is air, air that is time, 
the day is still leaving, 
the night has yet to arrive, 
figurations of mist 
at the turn of the corner, 
figurations of time 
at the bend in this pause... 
 
listen to me as one listens to the rain, 
the years go by, the moments return, 
do you hear the footsteps in the next room? 
not here, not there: you hear them 
in another time that is now, 
listen to the footsteps of time, 
inventor of places with no weight, nowhere, 
listen to the rain running over the terrace, 
the night is now more night in the grove, 
lightning has nestled among the leaves, 
a restless garden adrift-go in, 
your shadow covers this page. 
 




1. Paz evokes a time during which the day is leaving, while night approaches. It is 
not one or the other, but is becoming of both. It is a time that moves 
restlessly; it is adrift, it is a time marked by both termination and beginning. It 
is a time of dusk. Paz’s poem conveys the figural-textual metamorphosis that 
Catherine Malabou’s philosophical work accomplishes in relation to three 
different critical philosophical traditions which she calls motor schema: 
dialectics, destruction and deconstruction. Plasticity, which bears more than a 
passing resemblance to dusk, as a concept, triangulates these three schemes, 
borrowing different properties from each and giving back something entirely 
new in form (p.61). This emergent form is one aspect of a new materialism that 
Malabou maps in Plasticity at the Dusk of Writing, through an autobiographical 
summation of her philosophical investigations into the work of Hegel, 
Heidegger, and Derrida that have occupied much of the past decade. 
  
Anticipating the novelty of Malabou’s work for many readers, we use this 
review to describe the concept of plasticity in some depth, and discuss what it 
means to activate plasticity as a motor schema. We examine this book’s claim 
for a new materialism that emerges out of plasticity by focusing on the notion 
of form that emerges from plastic practices and upon which they rely. We are 
particularly interested in the potential of Malabou’s new materialism for 
imagining new and transformative political theory.  
Plasticity: a motor schema 
2. Malabou has elaborated on plasticity (plasticité) in many of her previous 
works,1 drawing, forming and annealing this idea from its annunciation in 
Hegel’s preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit2 where it signifies both the 
presence of a concept and the historical and contingent form illuminating and 
undermining it. In this book, Malabou looks back at her own travels with 
plasticity, tracing both the return to herself that is essential to Hegelian ideas 
of subjectivity—a presence—while disrupting that presence, the now in which 
she writes, exploring the gaps between metaphysics and its other. Plasticity is 
a “smuggler” (p. 8) in Malabou’s exposition, alive as both concept and its 
persistent, transformative movement that gives and receives form, that 
annihilates itself, and that spontaneously (re)organizes its fragments. Plasticity 
draws dialectical reason into a perpetual dusk where Minerva’s owl cannot rest, 
but it also appears within and among other philosophical registers, particularly 
in Heidegger’s destruction of metaphysics and Derrida’s deconstruction where 
it “metabolizes” and articulates these philosophies, vitalizing their concepts of 
space, time, and writing. Plasticity simultaneously negotiates the destruction of 
these philosophies, traveling among them, leaving a trace of its origin, 
graphing itself and reading itself anew, opening itself always to another 
plasticity. 
3. Plasticity flourishes in the excesses of philosophical reason, but what kind of 
spaces are these, and how politically malleable? Although it hearkens to an 
aesthetic experience, a sculpture or a poem for example, plasticity breaks with 
the artistic field (p. 54), remaining immune to an ideological aesthetic critique 
as it confers visibility without presence. Rather than the distant or 
transcendental spaces of the sublime or beautiful, Malabou locates plasticity 
alongside Lyotard’s idea of the “eye of discourse,”3 a concept that lends 
perspective from inside discourse by generating a “relief” in language from 
which the graphical and the figural are folded: an exteriority lacking 
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signification, a pure energy that makes the plastic arts even possible. This 
energy is not the gap opened up within difference, nor is it a metaphysical gap, 
but it works between and among these other spaces, as the form of writing (p. 
56). The figural-textual depth that it signals opens itself to a reading. But its 
location within discourse makes its emergence vulnerable to ideological 
misreadings that extend dominant capitalist notions, such as neoliberal ideas 
of labor flexibility,4 devoid of plasticity’s transformative potentials.  “We are 
entirely ignorant of plasticity but not at all of flexibility. In this sense, plasticity 
appears as the coming consciousness of flexibility.”5  
4. Readings that bring plasticity to consciousness are therefore intrinsic to the 
concept’s   motility and utility. Plastic reading, an engagement with the 
articulation of the graphical trace and the figural form, is not an effort to 
philosophically or politically define a paradigm in Malabou’s perspective; the 
way a text lives its deconstruction is a matter of its reading that is never naïve, 
that recognizes that we cannot read philosophy anew, and that our approach 
to Hegelian dialectics, Heideggerian destruction and Derridean deconstruction 
will forever bring these multiple perspectives into our efforts to put any 
singular one into play. Malabou’s emphasis on plastic reading ensures, 
therefore, that there is another Hegel, another Heidegger, another Derrida—“a 
childhood to come in the text” (p. 54)—that lives on through the processes of 
self-regulation, self-engenderment and, sometimes, exogenous or 
spontaneous annihilation, made palpable in the terms of these philosophical 
traditions but always in the spaces of their intercalation. The temporal 
understanding of structure in Hegel, for example, opens to a plastic reading 
which Malabou sees to be  
constituted by the temporal deployment of subjectivity. Because of its 
plasticity…subjectivity self-regulates (it bears its accidents without 
dissolving) and self-engenders (it actually produces the accidents it 
receives). This overarching structure involves several levels of organization: 
anthropological, theological, and philosophical. We move from one level to 
the next through differentiated sublation, through different types and levels 
of transformation. This formal and differential structure is neither the form 
“in itself” of the Hegelian system—the “integrity” that is supposed to 
precede its destruction or its deconstruction—nor is it the result of its 
destruction and deconstruction. The structure refers to the form of the 
system without its presence, the form of the dialectic without its 
metaphysical understanding. But this form is not a mere remainder. It 
relaunches itself beyond destruction and deconstruction. It puts into play or 
sets off again that of which it is the form. (p. 52) 
5. This initiation of play is sensuous activity, an event instantiated by plastic 
reading. All thought requires a scheme, Malabou argues, and as historical 
concept and style, plasticity has become an “energy sensor and rhythmic 
source of a new era” (p. 15), a rational motive “enabling it to force open the 
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door to an epoch and open up exegetical perspectives suited to it” (p. 13). In 
these productive ways, plasticity is a motor scheme, as significant today as 
writing, dialectics and deconstruction were before it. Plasticity’s dual sense as 
both the postmetaphysical real and tool to read this reality discloses the 
twilight of writing which has been the prior motor scheme. Derrida argued for 
the “semantic enlargement of the concept of writing” (p. 59) revealed in the 
form of program, information, and code and in the reading of genetic 
information, cybernetics, and all linguistic-graphic inscription. Yet plasticity 
emerges “where DNA no longer writes” (p. 60). Neuroscience has been one 
exemplary site for reinventing reading in a plastic manner, demonstrating that 
the significance of the synaptic gap is its inherent plasticity: its ability to 
modify its effectiveness through active linkages, spontaneous activities, and 
external events no longer tied to a reading of genetic code. Graphic metaphors 
inadequately capture the architecture constituted by the incessant activity of 
structural reorganization of neural pathways. Only a language both spatial and 
political—assemblies, forms, populations—will be adequate to “momentarily 
characterize the material organization of thought and being” (p. 61) and see its 
future. Plastic reading can reveal the political-material potential that lies 
beyond writing. 
6. A plastic mode of reading invites the reader to cognise her own subjectivity as 
plastic. As Malabou writes in What Should We Do With Our Brain?: “[w]e are 
living at the hour of neuronal liberation, and we do not know it. An agency 
within us gives sense to the code, and we do not know it... Humans make their 
own brain, but they do not know they are doing so.” (p. 8) Malabou’s persistent 
concern with the capacity for radical change that plasticity furnishes to every 
human individual is an invitation, of sorts, to engage a new materialism. This 
new materialism provokes a consideration of form, which, essential to its 
realisation, is conceptual (yet not ideal), and variously tangible, embodied, 
figural and mobile. 
 
New Materialism and the plastic subject 
 
7. Malabou’s materialism conjoins elements, practices, traits, habits and other 
machinations from three different philosophical traditions (dialectics, 
destruction, and deconstruction). The ‘time’ (or temporality) of this 
materialism engenders a space for transformation, for political agency, and for 
recognition of the circulation between forms of thought that are often 
assumed (or posited) to exist in opposing philosophical schema. For instance, 
in staging a confrontation between Heidegger and Hegel, Malabou deploys 
plasticity to re-articulate Heidegger’s concepts of migration and 
metamorphosis (in relation to the transformation of metaphysics) and Hegel’s 
fantastical “dimension of the absolute” (p. 34), the image of history that arrives 
with its putative fulfillment. By subjecting both Heidegger and Hegel to a 
plastic reading, she identifies points of suture and rupture at the interface 
between the motor schema of these two philosophers: 
How then are we to transform ourselves now that history 
is over? This question... is actually liberated by the history 
of an image. The migratory and the metamorphic are 
entirely directed toward the description of the production 
and superceding of this image, a superceding that opens 
  
up new schematic possibilities. Thus, it is at the point of 
this question—history and the pure image of history—that 
Hegel and Heidegger, if you like, hold hands... (p. 34)  
 
8. In stepping back from each of the motor schema she interrogates in order to 
delineate their plastic qualities, Malabou opens space for a materialism that is 
engaged with the individual’s desire to transform herself and to transform 
what is around her. The concept of plasticity operates in distinctly embodied 
material forms. In drawing on concepts of neuronal plasticity, Malabou 
engages precisely with the capacity of the individual to become otherwise, 
sometimes through self-direction, other times through accident. Malabou’s 
new materialism therefore has spatial and temporal qualities that are 
ultimately characterised by mobility and reflexivity. As form traverses different 
philosophical schema and opens each one to inflect on the other, it transforms 
itself.  
9. This new materialism has spatial and temporal dimensions that take shape 
through different rhythms. To return to Paz, this is a time of weightlessness; it 
is as though only through recombining elements from the spatial and 
temporal, at least figurally and textually to begin with, that we can break old 
habits that have confined us to metaphysically bounded understandings of 
form or have led us to embrace concepts such as the trace or the supplement 
as a means of escaping the metaphysics of presence. Thus we return to the 
time of dusk as a means of thinking about the temporal and spatial locations 
of this materialism, which are mobile and momentary; in motion. Dusk is a 
time and place of instability, uncertainty. It is a time of mourning, it is a time 
of many dusks, many interconnected sides of transformational masks—the 
artifact that Malabou borrows from Levi-Strauss to describe the multifaceted 
nature of plasticity. For Paz, time is also the inventor of places. Where is this 
weightless time? Perhaps it is a time that designates a place that is not 
bounded or territorialised yet is grounded in a time that is ‘now’, evocative of 
Benjamin’s revolutionary call to seize images of the past in order to shatter the 
weak messianism endowed by a non-revolutionary, teleological historicism.6 
The plastic subject seems furnished with the capacity to explode a continuum 
of history and its concomitant modes of thought that refuse to traverse a 
philosophical and material terrain, seeing the object of philosophy “in a 
radically new manner: as an imaginary object. This imaginary ‘object’ is Being 
itself, the powerfully hallucinatory effects of its phenomena” (p. 39). The 
subject at the heart of Malabou’s new materialism is a plastic subject. The 
plasticity of her (neuronal) habits enables an extension of herself beyond a 
present that is at once (over-)determined by the past and at the same time, 
seeks to dwell in a present that remains open to a future time that is not 
messianic. The plastic subject is a subject who moves; “while one movement is 




I do not believe in the absence of form or in a possible 
beyond of form any more than I believe in transcendence 
                                       
6 Walter Benjamin, “On the Concept of History”, 1940, 
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or the absence of negativity. Form is the 
metamorphizable but immovable barrier of thought. 
Writing will never abolish form. The trace will never pierce 
the figure. (p. 49) 
 
10. Form is indispensable to engage this new materialism—but what 
characterises this form? To speak of form that emerges in this temporal and 
spatial context is to enunciate a concept of form freed of the baggage of a 
metaphysics of presence, and indeed from a critique of the metaphysics of 
presence that would have us linger for too long in a logic of supplementarity 
and the trace. Malabou argues for an understanding of form that crosses the 
line of metaphysics, thereby opening up the conceptual and material space of 
an alterity for metaphysics (p. 50). She draws our attention not to the “other of 
form” but to “the other form”(p. 50). Plastic thinking in a very fundamental way 
explodes binaristic thinking and moves on to supercede deconstructive 
thought that would go so far as to understand the traditional concept of form 
as contaminated by its other (or constituted in part by its lack) but might not 
tread much further. Malabou maps a route of thinking about the “other form”, 
which essentially means thinking about the way that form metamorphosises. 
She goes further than this, asserting that “the metamorphosis of the traditional 
concept of form is perhaps the exegetic resource not only of destruction but 
also of the deconstruction of tradition itself.” (p. 50) 
11. In order to explore some of the political implications of this new 
materialism, we can ask how this notion of form may help us think differently 
about post-colonial theory (an area of critical thought that she has not yet 
addressed in her oeuvre). Malabou’s insistence on the crucial importance of 
form in contemporary philosophy is an attempt to stop the dematerialisation 
(and demonetarisation) of contemporary thought (p. 45). The insistence on the 
necessity to think about form, in conjunction with the neuronal, temporal, 
mobile and spatial dimensions of being rather than at the expense of these 
things, sets her far apart from contemporary thought that draws on concepts 
such as liminality (to take one example) to describe the post-colonial 
condition.  
12. The concept of liminality tells us little about the material and onto-
epistemic conditions that shape and structure ongoing colonial and capitalist 
violence. The deployment of liminality, as one aspect of some post-colonial 
theories that are beholden to a mélange of anti-colonial and post-structurally 
inspired critiques of colonial formations, reflects a philosophical position that 
turns its gaze away from the subtle modes of circulation that characterise the 
relation between material, ontological and aesthetic registers of being. Rather, 
concepts such as liminality are used to describe states of being that are ‘in-
between’ two different cultural, racialised or ethno-national communities, even 
in light of repeated disavowals of racial or cultural essences. Liminality is also 
posited as a space that exists between two onto-epistemological states of 
being; black and white polarities are to be avoided because of their very 
indeterminacy as categories of identification.7 However, dwelling in a liminal 
space does little to metamorphosise these categories; either in terms of going 
beyond an acknowledgment of their co-constitutiveness, or in regards to 
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transforming them into something else entirely. The spatial and temporal 
metaphor of the interstitial that liminality evokes seems sanitised of any 
appreciation of form, as embodiment as a mode of being, that goes beyond 
merely graphic, figural or literary representation.  Such thinking further 
reinforces a vision of modernity that simply re-narrativises history as a way of 
making sense of violence in post-colonial contexts. We end up with a de-
materialised, non-dialectical and partial rendering of the ongoing effects of 
colonialism and their particular imbrication with capitalism.  
13. While anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist political struggles are lauded and 
liberally cited, Fanon customarily invoked (but somehow stripped of his 
revolutionary Marxist politics), the brand of post-colonial theory that dwells in 
the spaces of the liminal and unhomely remain largely unconcerned with a 
materialism that could potentially address itself to the violence of capitalist 
relations of dispossession and alienation. For instance, the miners’ strike of 
the mid 1980’s is rendered by Bhabha in terms of a “war of positions” and a 
“struggle of identifications”,8 which for Bhabha, requires a politics that could 
embrace a “negotiated hybridity”. Transforming the political, and political 
subjectivities, in a manner that accounts for the multiple and contradictory 
relations that colonial formations and capitalist relations throw up perhaps 
requires more (of us) than an interrogatory style. 
14. Malabou too speaks of a type of negotiation; but a negotiation that involves 
a metamorphosis of form, and a form that metamorphosises. The change that 
leads to the exceeding of metaphysics must be thought and this change 
necessarily occurs through a negotiation between form and form, through a 
metamorphic negotiation. The gap, the rupture, the piercing, and the mobility 
of the trace do not have any power to declaustrate or transgress by and in 
themselves. A trans-formation, in the literal sense, must take place, opening 
the depth of a new referentiality or another body in both the structure and in 
its dislocation. (p. 50) This negotiation is thus not merely an acknowledgment 
of states of being that are contaminated by one another, hybrid, liminal or 
otherwise, but is an agentive mode of negotiation that purposefully utilises its 
mobility to disrupt existing ways of being and existing modes of 
understanding being. Malabou’s concept of form and its metamorphic 
negotiations present us with different avenues for thinking the spatial and 
temporal dimensions of the post-colonial. Rather than attempting to escape 
the closure inevitably programmed into concepts of national territoriality and 
sovereignty (to take one example), she suggests this is, rather, “a matter of 
how to escape within closure itself” (p. 65). In many ways, Malabou’s 
theorisation of form, as something that traverses the body, the neuronal, and 
philosophical discourse (understood as signaling thick, aesthetic, visible forms 
of writing (seen in painting, fiction, music, poetry, (p. 56), and we would add 
sculpture, film, dance and other art forms) surpasses deconstructive 
renderings of the relation between immanence and transcendence, or form and 
substance, by insisting on the mobility and near-inevitability of metamorphic 
transformation of form itself. The refusal to accept form as an ethical and 
political reality capable of its own transformation (a position argued by Levinas 
and Derrida who insisted on the ethical trace of the radically other) is, for 
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Malabou, a Marxist fetish threatening to collapse the cosmopolitan project with 
hypercapitalism (p. 77).  
15. If we can politically engage our own future as Malabou’s conscious echo of 
Marx in The 18th Brumaire makes clear, in what way is plasticity less a vehicle 
for ideology, less transparent to capitalist imperative? As plasticity continues to 
insert itself as the dominant motor scheme of our age, as it increasingly 
characterizes form, how can it be grasped? The problem that Malabou grapples 
with is that plasticity as a new materialism is necessarily naturalizing, 
seemingly weightless: “it is in fact so familiar to us that we do not even see 
it….it has become the form of our world.”9 This paradox is, Malabou insists, 
merely apparent, easily exploded. The critique of neuronal ideology shows us 
that thinking is not program, is not written, leaves no trace, requires no space. 
Translated into the critique of political economy, this is a way of 
reconceptualizing the circulation of values, to see that this circulation is not 
itself a trace, but rather a form. And like all forms, neuronal and capitalistic, it 
is a form that is open to explosion, to another form, to another future. 
16. The philosophical, scientific and political commitment to the possibility of 
another form is a commitment to remain open and attentive to sexual, 
biological and political self-fashioning, to the plasticity of all identity, to new 
ideas and experiences of difference. It is a commitment to listen 
metaphorically to the rain in the many evocative ways that Paz poetically 
captures. And it is a means for reimagining the work of philosophy on the self 
in the powerful ways that Malabou takes up her intellectual autobiography in 
this short but shattering book. Malabou has provided a tantalizing glimpse of 
the ways in which philosophy at the dusk of writing must increasingly become 
our own way to recognize our potentials in an era of plasticity. As a portal to 
her vast and powerful oeuvre, this book invites a first encounter with plastic 
reading.  
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